We analyze the claims that video recreations of shoulder surng attacks oer a suitable alternative and a baseline, as compared to evaluation in a live setting. We recreated a subset of the factors of a prior video-simulation experiment conducted by Aviv et al. (ACSAC 2017), and model the same scenario using live participants (n = 36) instead (i.e., the victim and attacker were both present). The live experiment conrmed that for Android's graphical patterns video simulation is consistent with the live setting for attacker success rates. However, both 4-and 6-digit PINs demonstrate statistically signicant dierences in attacker performance, with live attackers performing as much 1.9x better than in the video simulation. The security benets gained from removing feedback lines in Android's graphical patterns are also greatly diminished in the live setting, particularly under multiple attacker observations, but overall, the data suggests that video recreations can provide a suitable baseline measure for attacker success rate. However, we caution that researchers should consider that these baselines may greatly underestimate the threat of an attacker in live settings.
The area of shoulder surng has been the subject of a great deal of work [4, 6-10, 12, 13, 18, 19] , for both understanding the threat and proposing mechanisms to prevent it. Of particular relevance to this study (termed "current study"), is the work conducted by Aviv et al. [4] (termed: "prior study"). The prior study examined the shoulder surng susceptibility of three commonly used unlock authentication mechanisms: 4-and 6-digit PINs, 4-and 6-length Android graphical patterns, and 4-and 6-length Android graphical patterns with the feedback display turned o (lines rendered by the interface between grid points as they are touched by the user). Due to the dicult nature of evaluating shoulder surng attacks in the eld, the goal of the prior study was to establish baselines for shoulder surng vulnerability in controlled settings that can be used to compare across authentication types and used as baseline for evaluating authentication systems that are designed to defend against such attacks.
To control the analysis, the prior study was conducted using a video-based methodology where the researchers recorded a set of videos with highly controlled factors and then asked participants to view these videos as a simulated shoulder surng scenario. The data was analyzed to determine shoulder-surng susceptibility under each condition. The attack rate (how eectively the participant could recall the passcode entered in the video) was the primary metric.
In this paper, we seek to compare the video-based methodology to a similarly controlled live setting. In particular, we are interested in assessing the prior work's following ndings relating to the attack success rate.
• Longer authentication lengths (e.g, 4-digit vs. are less vulnerable. • PIN authentication is less vulnerable to the attack compared to patterns with and without feedback lines. • Removing the feedback lines from patterns decreases the vulnerability to shoulder surng. • Multiple observations increases vulnerability.
• Video based evaluation provides a baseline for live, in-person shoulder surng vulnerability.
Using the raw results of the prior study, we compare the attacker success rates of the live setting to a comparable subset of the video study data. Testing for dierences in proportionality, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the attacker success rate are the same for Android patterns as well as in many of the settings with patterns without feedback lines. This suggests that there is consistency between the results of the video and live simulations. However, the advantage of removing feedback lines previously observed in video simulation is considerably lessened in the live setting. For PINs, we observe signicant dierence between the video and the live settings, where live attackers performed up to 1.9x better in some scenarios. Stereo vision seems to greatly improve the reliability of recalling the more complex motions of entering a PIN. Despite this discrepancy, the claim of Aviv et al. of these results forming a baseline is still supported: we never observed a situation by which the live simulation performed worse than a video study when signicant dierences exist.
We conclude that video studies do provide a reasonable approximation for live simulation of shoulder surng in settings that involve graphical passwords (but not PINs), like the Android password pattern, and at least a lower-bound on the attack success rate for all tested authentication types (including PINs). However, researchers should consider that this lower-bound may be a signicant underestimation compared to the true attack rate in live simulations.
RELATED WORK
Mobile authentication and observation attacks. Threats such as shoulder-surng attacks have been well documented by researchers [4, 27] . Studies have been conducted examining experiences of users who had encountered observation attacks [11] where shoulder surng was found to be "casual" and "opportunistic. " Harbach et al. [14] found that participants only very rarely reported shoulder surng (0.3% of 1134 sampled events) as an immediate high risk threat when authenticating.
In order to minimize the risk associated with observation attacks, users are known to modify their own usage behaviors when using a mobile device, hiding the device from sight and performing mobile interactions in the pocket or bag, or even shielding the screen [1] . Solutions also exist to obscure screens from third parties [8] , to detect the presence of shoulder surfers in a nearby vicinity [20] or to deceive onlookers from data being entered [17, 24] . Attacks have also been simulated by having observers watch video footage of victims entering authentication sequences. Examples include [15] where attacks took place from top and side views. A range of solutions have also been proposed to minimize the likelihood of shoulder-surng when entering authentication sequences [2] . However, as highlighted by Wiese and Roth [27] , it can be dicult to compare the ecacy of these solutions, as the ways in which these systems are studied varies. Furthermore, the outcomes can be dicult to compare and interpret.
Evaluating resistance from shoulder surng. Many evaluation studies have focused on observing unlock screen interactions where PINs and patterns are entered [4, 15, 22] . Wiese and Roth [27] suggest that conducting such studies are challenging because real-world adversaries are not available for study and must be simulated in one way or another. In contrast to live studies where participants and actors/researchers perform tasks together in person, video simulations have been used to identify susceptibility of on-screen threats [2, 21] . Video recordings oer consistency when presented to multiple users [27] , and can also be accessed independent of location. However, research indicates that that the success of adversaries is lower when performing video observations compared to live settings [23, 27] ; we make a similar observation here. Prior research also recommends that shoulder surng attackers should be allowed a number of observations [27] as well as viewing interactions from a range of views [4, 21] and dierent properties of passcodes [4] . Additionally, the hand position [22] and interaction style when entering data into the device [4] should also be considered. We tested scenarios found to be signicant in Aviv et al., following similar procedures.
Overview of Aviv et al. [4] . Aviv et al. considered the lack of a baseline for comparing common unlock authentication mechanisms under the threat of shoulder surng. As a method of creating such a baseline, the authors used a series of controlled video simulations of a victim entering unlock authentications using several methods. These methods were PINs and Android's graphical pattern unlock, with and without feedback lines present. Additional factors were considered, including the angle of observation, number of observations, the number of recreation attempts by the observer, the hand posture of the victim, phone size, and spatial layout of the passcodes.
The methodology of that experiment was multi-factorial. Participants were selected into one of a number of independent factors (phone type, passcode choice, authentication type, hand posture) and then a set of randomized dependent factors (passcodes, observation angles, number of views, and attempts). For recruitment, the primary results were based o participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk (n = 1173) and participants recruited locally (n = 91), with both groups completing a web survey whereby they viewed videos of authentication and attempted to recreate the passcodes observed.
Using the results, the authors tested the following hypotheses (the -p indicates a prior work hypothesis):
• H1-p: The type of unlock authentication, PIN pattern with lines, patterns without lines, aects the shoulder surng vulnerability. • H2-p: Repeated viewing of user input increases the likelihood of a shoulder surng vulnerability. • H3-p: Multiple attempts to recreate the input aects the likelihood of a shoulder surng vulnerability. • H4-p: The angle of observations aects shoulder surng vulnerability. • H5-p: The properties of the unlock authentication, such as length and visual features, aect shoulder surng vulnerability. • H6-p: The phone size aects shoulder surng vulnerability.
• H7-p: The hand position used to hold and interact with a device aects shoulder surng vulnerability. Of those hypotheses, H1-p, H2-p, H3-p, H4-p, and H6-p were accepted, while H5-p was partially accepted, and H7-p was rejected. The authors claim that the video studies, generally, can form a reasonable replacement for live simulation, and that at the very least a video study could provide a baseline for shoulder-surng vulnerability.
METHODOLOGY
To investigate the ecacy of video-based recreations for evaluating observation attacks, we recreated the study conducted by Aviv et al. [4] with live participants in a controlled lab environment. We asked participants to position themselves in similar locations to where the cameras were positioned in the prior study. They then attempted to shoulder-surf a victim (played by a proctor). We varied the type and length of authentication sequences, observation angle, and number of repeated viewing attempts, to determine if these factors impact the success of the attacker. The results were then compared with Aviv et al. 's ndings using a comparable subset of the prior data. For simplicity of discussion, we refer to the prior work of Aviv et al. as the video study and the results here as the live study.
Hypotheses. In particular, we are interested in testing the following hypothesis related to the ecacy of video based shoulder surng experiments as compared to live settings.
• H1-r: Live shoulder surng conrms accepting prior hypotheses: -H1-p: The authentication type aects shoulder surng vulnerability -H2-p: Repeated viewing aects shoulder surng vulnerability -H4-p: The angle of observation aects shoulder surng vulnerability -H5-p: The properties of the passcodes aects should surfing vulnerability • H2-r: Video simulation forms a baseline of performance compared to live settings.
Study Design and Materials
Treatments. The study followed a mixed factorial design, similar to the video study. Independent variables included authentication type (PIN vs pattern) on the Nexus 5 device using the same hand posture/interaction style (one-handed, right thumb input). For dependent variables, we reduced the observation angle to two (left or right) as opposed to the ve angles used in prior work. The video study used the variety of angles to simulate dierent heights, but height variation is naturally present in a live study. We kept the same variables for observations (single observation from one angle, two observations from the same angle, or two observations from dierent angles), and we used a lab environment for our live study very similar to the set-up to capture videos for the video study (Aviv et al.) (see Figure 1 ). There were two notable dierences between factors in the video study and the live study. First, we only allowed each participant a single attempt at recreating the passcode. This choice was motivated by results of the video study whereby participants, knowing they would have multiple attempts in advance, actually did worse at the tasks than those that knowingly had one attempt. It was conjectured that participants attempted to "game" the task knowing that they would have multiple attempts at recreating the passcode. As such, we only allowed participants to make one recreation attempt, and this fact was communicated during training.
Another dierence in the live study was that passcode recreation occurred using pen-and-paper, as opposed to a simulation of the device used in the video study. This choice was made to simplify the data collection procedures for both proctors and participants.
Finally, as we only tested a subset of the treatments of the prior video study, we only performed our analytic comparisons on a relevant subset of the video study data. In particular, we removed data that included a top angle and reduced the two side angles into a single left or right setting. Additionally, as the video cannot Auth. id Patterns PINs  0  0145  1328  1  014763  153525  2  1346  159428  3  136785  1955  4  3157  366792  5  4572  441791  6  642580  458090  7  6745  5962  8  743521  6702  9 841257 7272 Table 1 : Authentication identiers for patterns and PINs. To the right, the numeric labeling for patterns to contact points.
control for monitor display size, which was a large factor in the prior results, we only used the most ideal viewing conditions, where the reported y-axis pixels were greater than 1800. We believe this restriction provided the most fair comparisons possible given the potential uncontrolled factors. We discuss limitations and realism further in Section 4.
Authentication types. We analyzed three authentication types with two dierent length settings, as used in the video study. These included:
• PIN: 4-or 6-length PINs consisting of a set of numbers.
• PAT: Android unlock patterns consisting of 4 or 6 contact points with the feedback lines present. • NPAT: Android unlock patterns consisting of 4 or 6 contact points without the feedback lines present. While the PIN interaction display is as one expects, the presence or absence of grid pattern feedback lines is less well known. When a pattern is entered with feedback lines (PAT), the display will show connecting lines on the screen between grid points touched by the user while entering their passcode shape. Alternatively, the connecting lines are not rendered on screen during passcode entry in the without feedback lines (NPAT) pattern display, although the user must still contact the appropriate points in the correct order. As identied by Aviv et al. [4] and von Zezschwitz et al. [25] , the absence of feedback lines can make it more dicult for an observer to recreate the patterns. As part of H1-r, we will make a similar evaluation.
To maintain consistency, we used the same set of patterns and PINs as in prior work (Table 1 and Appendix B.1). The patterns were selected from an online study of self-reported patterns [3] , and the PINs were obtained from sequences of digits in leaked password sets, similar to the analysis by Bonneau et al. [5] . Further, the set of passcodes were selected for physical properties, as the layout and sequence of gestures in entry may aect shoulder surng attack rate. The patterns' spatial properties might aect surng attacks because an attacker's view from some viewing angles might be obscured for some parts of the touchscreen.
Randomization and counterbalancing. One of the restrictions for performing the study using live participants as compared to video recreation is that the same level of randomization is nearly impractical for the target recruitment size and the set of factors being considered. As such, we designed a two stage randomization procedure, one for ordering the passcodes and one for ordering the observation angles.
In particular, Table 2 contains three dierent randomized orders across the passcode. These are labeled Order a, b, and c. Note that the authentication identiers refer to Table 1 . In Table 3 are four randomized orders for observation angles (i, ii, iii, and iv). For each participant, we randomly assigned them a passcode order and an observation angle, producing 12 dierent randomizations.
At this point, it is important to consider counterbalancing. Selecting randomized orders for passcodes or observations can weight the data improperly. This leads to an optimization problem, and we used a utility function to nd a set of randomized orders that would provide (1) sucient data in each factor for us to perform statistical tests, (2) a roughly equal ratio of data within each factor being compared (4-vs 6-length, auth-type, angle), (3) that each passcode only appears once per viewing, and (4) that within each viewing sequence, per participant, there are roughly an equal number of single and multiple observations. We found a case that nearly met these criteria, as displayed in Table 2 and 3. The weighting is then displayed based on 12 participants in Table 4 , leaving us with 72 single-view observations and 48 multi-view observations, 24 from the same angle twice and 24 from two dierent angles. Additionally, there is equal weighting across angles and viewing (Table 3) , and nearly equal weighting across passcodes.
We acknowledge that this counterbalancing is not a perfect weighting, and solving this particular optimization problem is challenging and may not have a solution. However, the resulting counterbalancing compares favorably to the subset of relevant video study data. For PINs, there is nearly an equal number of observations in the one-view and two-view conditions. For PAT/NPAT, there is 50% less observations in one-view condition with a signicant proportion necessary for statistical testing, and the two-view conditions for PAT/NPAT are of the same magnitude as the video study (see Table 6 ).
In total, we were able to run complete trials for 18 participants each for PAT and NPAT, and all of those 36 participants also completed a PIN viewing. The order between PIN and PAT/NPAT for participants was randomized, so that half of the participants completed a PIN trial before doing a PAT/NPAT trial, and the other half completed the protocol in the reverse order, PAT/NPAT then PIN.
Live Simulation Setup and Coordination
We sought to recreate nearly the same scenario for shoulder surng as the video study. Namely, we had our victim placed in a sitting position with the participant observer behind the victim, either standing to the right or the left, directed by one of two proctors. These were the same positions where the cameras were located (near left and near right views) in the study by Aviv et al. [4] . See Figure 1 for a visual of this arrangement for the live study. Additionally, for the phone application used to enter the passcodes, we used the same mobile applications as in the prior study, which includes a web-based platform for entering PINs and patterns. Screenshots of those applications are provided in Figure 2 .
For patterns with feedback lines, the white tracing lines would follow the user gesture, and once the pattern was entered, it would remain visible on-screen for a half a second before disappearing. The same would be true for the patterns without feedback lines, however, neither the tracing lines nor the contact points of the grid would be rendered on the screen. For PINs, the layout allowed for numeric entry as expected. Once digit keys were selected, the corresponding digits were presented on the interface. These would then fade to a * after a half a second, similar to most mobile PIN entry interfaces.
For the participant observer to record their pattern entry, we used pen and paper. Examples of the observer forms are provided in the Appendix (A.3). The forms had text boxes and mini-diagrams of the application interfaces, so the participants could easily record the observed entry. Participants were asked not to write down the passcodes observed until directed following all observations, which was important for the multiple viewing scenario.
As shown in Figure 1 , two pre-marked spots were placed on the oor to direct participants where to stand on the left or right side. The second proctor, following the randomized treatment order, would call out directions to the participant; for example, "one view, from the left" or "two views, rst from left and then right. " Once the participant was in place for each view, the second proctor would cue the rst proctor (playing the victim) to enter a passcode.
At this point, a signicant challenge we had to overcome was how to prompt the victim-proctor with the correct passcode to enter without tipping o the participant-observer. Due to the randomization procedures, requiring the victim-proctor to memorize the numerous orderings was not realistic. As a solution, we developed a Google Glass application to guide the victim-proctor through the various passcode orders. Google Glass is a wearable eyeglass display unit that runs on a modied Android OS. It enables one to scroll interactively through images projected onto a viewing screen built into the right eyepiece. Moreover, the small display screen on the Google Glass was not visible to the participant. A screenshot of the Google Glass application is provided in Figure 3 .
Procedure
The replication experiment proceeded in four stages:
(1) Informed Consent and Ante Hoc Questionnaire: All participants were properly informed and consented, as we conducted an IRB approved experiment. Following consent, we asked participants to complete an ante hoc questionnaire that covered basic demographic questions, such as age and gender, as well as questions regarding the participants experience with smartphones, mobile authentication, and sense of risk from shoulder surng. The subjective response questions were largely intended to orient participants to physical security issues related to the study. The ante hoc questions are found in the Appendix (A.1). As each participant completed two trials, one for either PAT or NPAT and another for PIN, once the trial stage was over for the rst authentication we would return to training for the second authentication. As a way to control for training eects, whereby observing PINs rst could increase or decrease performance on observing PAT/NPAT, we ensured that there was an even ratio between the order of the trials. A guide was also followed to ensure that the researchers followed the same steps in the protocol (see Appendix A.4).
Recruitment
Participants were recruited from university student mailing lists, and paid $5 (USD). In total, we recruited 36 participants, including 10 females. The cohort was predominately aged between 18 to 24 years old. Almost two-thirds of participants used iOS mobile devices. 21 used a ngerprint reader to unlock their phones, and 6 used patterns (we did not ask if feedback lines were turned o). The demographic breakdown, as well as their choice in mobile device and authentication are presented in Table 5 .
Additionally presented in Table 5 are the demographics of a comparable set of participants from the prior video study; these participants observed authentication on the Nexus 5 phone in the "in-person" lab setup or the on-line MTurk setup with a screen Table 5 : Demographic, phone usage, and unlock authentication types of participants. For the video study, the subset of comparable data that includes participants in both the "in-person" and "online" settings that had screen resolution greater than 1800px and observed patterns on the Nexus 5 phone.
resolution of at least 1800px in the y-axis, the most realistic setting of the prior work. The breakdown of these two groups are similar, slightly younger overall with about 70/30 gender breakdown.
REALISM AND LIMITATIONS
As described in the previous section, we attempted, as best as possible, to recreate the settings of the prior video study in live simulation. Due to the complexities of performing such a process, the study described in this paper had its own set of limitations.
Viewing angles. While we use a similar lab environment for the live simulation to that used in the video study, the participants could not stand in exactly the same position as the cameras due to height dierences and the relatively close proximity of the near and far angles from a given side. We thus reduced the observations to simply left and right and relied on the fact that our participants naturally vary in height to compensate for the near and far setting of camera height placement in the prior study.
Victim entry speed. Another recreation challenge is that our victim (a proctor) must enter the authentication sequence many times over at a consistent speed. Clearly, a video ensures consistency here, and so we trained the victim-proctor on the original videos to maintain consistent timings of authentication entry. While there is no guarantee that every participant viewed the authentication at the same rate, we believe this training, and the total number of entries performed by the victim, ensures consistency. Further, the same victim-proctor was used in all data collection.
Subset of conditions. As summarized in Section 3, a subset of the original conditions were used in the live simulation. We kept factors that were shown to be signicant in the video study, but also had to remove some that posed usability challenges for the proctor acting as the victim. While the selection process was done carefully to address conditions likely to be important, it was also done for a practical nature of conducting a study with live participants as compared to online. To ensure that we made a fair comparison, we selected a similar subset of the data from the prior study. In particular, we used results from the previous study from participants who had viewing screens of at least 1800px across, who viewed authentication attempts via the Nexus 5 phone with thumb input from the left or right side.
Pen-and-paper attacker recordings. As participants were using pen-and-paper to record their observations during the shoulder surng attack, some participants were able to use this as an added aid to support recall of the passcodes. For example, some participants were viewed by the proctor mimicking the movements made by the victim-proctor between multiple-view conditions prior to writing down their nal observation. While we directed participants to not do this during training, it was dicult to stop due to the nature of the task. In the video study, participants were also directed not to use additional aids, such as writing down observations while observing the passcodes, and were required to attest to this. However, it is possible that the attestations were not fully truthful, nor could the researchers verify this as the study was conducted online. As such, as neither study could fully control for this we believe that this provides for a fair comparison.
Ecological validity. Low levels of ecological validity are known to be commonplace among lab-based studies for mobile interactions [16] . Although the method and setting selected for our study cannot approximate the conditions by which shoulder surng may take place in-the-wild, we designed the study to provide a sense of realism even in a lab-based environment (e.g. victim in seated position similar to attacks taking place while seated on public transport, while seated in a classroom, etc.). However, due to time constraints, conditions such as providing multiple attempts to observe and/or recreate entry, could not be examined. Further study would be needed to widen the range of factors examined, and to identify the applicability of these ndings to other types of tasks (e.g. authenticating while ambulatory) or other types of settings (e.g. eld-based). 
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RESULTS
As the live simulation used a subset of the variables in the video study (see prior section), we in turn performed comparisons on an appropriate subset of the video study data. We used video data that met the following criteria: one-handed/thumb-input on the Nexus 5 (red) phone, viewed from the left or right angle, and a single recreation attempt. Additionally, we only included video data that was collected with a screen resolution > 1800 pixels, which was identied as the most ideal viewing condition in the prior study [4] . With these reductions, we compared 720 shoulder surng attempts for the live simulation to a comparable 1,171 attempts in the video study.
Comparing Attack Rates Across Video and Live Studies
Statistical Procedures. As the results of the experiments for both the live and video study are proportional, either the participant succeeded in recreating the passcode or did not, we compare the results using a proportionality test for equality of proportions, which follows a 2 distribution. That is, we compare the attacker success rate for the video study to that of the live study using the same conditions, reporting the 2 statistic, the two-tailed p value, and the 95% condence interval ( 95 ) for the dierence between proportions.
In the cases where p  0.05, we can conclude that the live study was not well modeled by the video study because the proportions of attacker success are signicantly dierent. Similarly if p > 0.05 we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two proportions are the same and thus must conclude that the proportions are more likely measuring the same eect. The condence interval reports the most likely range of dierence between the attacker success rate for the video and live results, but is only relevant when a signicant dierence is found.
When comparing data across factors with greater than two conditions, we used a 2 test for goodness of t to determine signicant dierences in attack success rates. Post-hoc analysis is conducted using pairwise comparisons with a Bonferonni correction.
Across tests, while the data is overlapping for some of the factors being examined, we do not normalize/correct p values as we are not attempting to control for type-1 errors across all tests. Instead, we are performing exploratory analysis and interested in determining if signicant dierences may exist and from where they may arise. In post-hoc analysis, as described above, we do correct p values as appropriate as this occurs within a single test with directly overlapping hypothesis.
Authentication Types (H1-r/H1-p). In the prior study, a key nding was that a statistical dierence was identied in attacker performance across authentication type. We can perform the same tests by comparing vulnerability to shoulder surng for the single view conditions; see the rst column of Table 6 .
We rst compare each of the authentications between the video and the live study, irrespective of the authentication length. For patterns with feedback lines (termed: PAT) ( 2 = 0.0, p = 1), there is strong statistical similarity. However, for patterns without lines (termed: NPAT) ( 2 = 4.54, p = 0.03) we do see a signicant dierence between the live and video study, and an even more prominent dierence for PINs ( 2 = 37.76, p = 0.00). Statistical dierences for NPAT can be accounted for by an increase in the 4-length performance for attackers in the live setting (see Table 6 ), and for PINs, we consistently see performance increases for the live setting compared to the video setting. In this case, the success rate for PINs in the video setting is 65/208=32.0% compared to 135/216=62.5% for the live setting, an increase of 1.95x; however, the video study does provide a baseline.
We can also compare authentication types within collection method, as related to H1-p. Using a three-way 2 tests with pairwise comparisons, there are statistically signicant dierences between each of the success rates for each of the authentications for both the live ( 2 = 24.8, p = 0.00) and video ( 2 = 133.4, p = 0.00) settings. The residuals suggest the leading cause of this dierence is the increased diculty of shoulder surng PINs, for both the video and live setting, but post-hoc, pairwise-analysis (with Bonferroni correction) suggest the benets of removing feedback lines in NPAT is not consistent across studies. While there are statistical dierences between PAT and NPAT in the video study, this eect disappears in the live study with p = .147 (under the correction). This provides further evidence that removing traceback lines from pattern entry provides limited protection, and perhaps less than what was previously considered [25] .
Despite seeing a reduced benet from NPAT as compared to PAT, we can conrm H1-p in the live setting. The authentication type has an impact on shoulder surng performance as evident in the dierences in attacker success rate for dierent authentication types, particularly for PINs.
Repeated Viewings (H1-r/H2-p). An important result of the video study was the nding that repeated viewings have signicant impact on attacker performance (H2-p). By expanding our view of Table 6 to the Two-Same and Two-Dierent column, we can test for similar eects resulting from repeated viewings. As before, we observe the most consistency in the PAT and NPAT settings for the live and video study, and strong dierences in the PIN setting. However, where we do see signicant dierence the condence interval suggest that the video study does provide a baseline to the live setting.
We can further directly measure the impact of multiple viewings by performing within collection method 2 tests across viewing methods. For PAT, no eect could be identied for multiple views in both the video and live settings. There is an eect for NPAT in the live ( 2 = 12.0, p < 0.01) but not in the video setting ( 2 = 5.1, p = 0.08). Post-hoc analysis revealed that, for NPAT in the live setting, having the same viewing angles twice compared to a single viewing angle or two dierence angles drives this dierence (p = 0.03, corrected), suggesting that two-dierent viewing conditions for NPAT is most advantageous to an attacker.
The case is similar for PINs. In the live setting, a statistically signicant dierence occurs for conditions of repeated views ( 2 = 23.1, p = 0.00). However, this was not the case for the video setting ( 2 = 4.1, p = 0.14). Post-hoc analysis suggests that gaining any repeated viewing, the same angle twice or two dierent, benets the attacker signicantly in the live setting. The lack of signicance for the video setting may be due to using this particular subset of video data, but we conjecture that it more likely reects the high diculty of shoulder surng PINs, generally, which was further exacerbated by the video observation setting without stereo vision.
Overall, we can conrm H2-p in the live setting, that repeated viewings have an impact on performance. Where there were previous signicant dierences in the video study, these persisted in the live setting, except for NPAT. While there is consistency in viewing the same angle twice, observing the entry from multiple angles seems to play a larger role in the live setting compared to the video setting. However, the larger hypothesis that repeated views impacts performance of shoulder surng is conrmed.
Observation Angle (H1-r/H4-p). To assess the impact of observation angle, we use only single-view conditions so as not to conate the results with the impact of multiple observations. These results are presented in Table 7 with pairwise comparisons between the live and video study for dierent passcode lengths.
While we continue to see signicant dierences for PIN and a lack thereof for PAT, we see signicant improvements in the live setting for NPAT viewed from the right angle. We conjecture that this improved attacker performance relates to being able to stereoscopically determine touch locations that are more challenging to see from the same angle via video simulation. However, depth of touch events continue to be more challenging when viewed from the left angle. The dierence between the observations angles here may also explain other statistical dierences in the previously presented results for NPAT.
However, overall, we do not see signicant dierences when comparing within a collection method and authentication when comparing left vs. right angle. This is in conict with prior work; however, recall that the top observation angle was removed and the two near and far angles were reduced to a single side angle (L or R). As the two comparable subsets are consistent, we can conrm that under H4-p the live settings are well predicted by a comparable subset of video data.
Passcode Properties (H1-r/H5-p). In Table 8 , again using single view data, a direct comparison between each of the passcodes used in the study is displayed, with ndings from proportionality tests between the live and video setting. We nd that no signicant dierences exist for the PAT and NPAT codes, and only three of the PIN codes show dierences. These include the following PINs: 5962, 159428, and 366792 with the live setting attacker performance being signicantly better in each case. The spatial properties of these codes (see Appendix B.2) does not suggest that a single factor played a role. Although both 5962 and 3669722 are both right shifted PINs, there are too many other features at play to draw conclusions.
We can perform a within-collection method analysis across the passcodes using a 2 test, and we nd that signicant dierences exist for the attacker success rate within both the live and video study, for all authentication types. However, post-hoc analysis suggest that none of the NPAT pairwise comparisons are signicant, and only one set of PAT pairwise comparisons are signicant (743521 vs. 3157) -743521 was the most dicult of the patterns to shoulder surf. For PINs in post-hoc analysis, again 159428 and 366792 have signicant comparisons, particularly with PINs 7272 and 1955, which were two of the easiest PINs to shoulder surf in comparison to 159428 and 366792, two of the most dicult to shoulder surf.
Finally, we can compare the impacts of length. For PAT, we do not see signicant dierences between success rate for 4-vs. 6length patterns ( 2 = 2.9, p = 0.09), but we do for the video study ( 2 = 12.83, p < 0.001). We nd the reverse for NPAT, where there is a signicant dierence in length for the live setting ( 2 = 5.7, p = 0.02) and not for the video study ( 2 = 3.64, p = 0.06). Finally, we see signicant dierences for PIN for both live ( 2 = 28.9, p = 0.00) and video ( 2 = 27.6, p = 0.00). This suggests that, yes, the length of the passcode can have an impact, conrming H1-r for the H5p condition; however, other properties of the passcode were not signicant, but were so in similar ways between the two studies under the subset being evaluated.
Hypothesis H1-r. Based on the results presented previously, in each case we are able to nd conrmation of each of the previous hypotheses, although, we also nd that PINs are the least consistent. This suggests that researchers should be more skeptical of results related to PIN based authentication in the video setting. In particular, the true values may be much higher. Additionally, we nd strong evidence that the dierences between PAT and NPAT may be greatly dimensioned (although still dierent) in the live setting.
Hypothesis H2-r. We can conrm H2-r that video based recreations do provide a baseline for live simulation. Observe that in all cases where there is signicant dierences between a video and live measurement in Tables 6, 7 , and 8, the condence interval suggests that the live setting has higher proportionality than that of video setting. In essence, yes, the video study provides a baseline, but the baseline may be much lower than one may expect, as much as 1.7x.
Post-Hoc Participant Feedback
One advantage of the live study is that the researchers can directly observe the strategies of the participants and the relative diculties encountered, as well as via post hoc questions (the precise questions are found in the Appendix A.2). There is no direct comparison to the Aviv et al. prior work here, but we believe that the strategies likely mirror those used by participants in the video study, to some extent. The most commonly reported strategy for the observation task (n=16) was simply focusing on memorizing the passcode as it appeared and then, after it was completely entered, writing it down immediately without delay. Only three participants reported strategies involving writing or physically mirroring the input gesture while it was happening. Other participants (n=2) described "chunking" PINs into larger numbers (e.g. "seventeen" versus "one-seven") (4572) features that challenged some observers, and patterns that were deemed more memorable by some observers because they oered easy symbolic associations.
in their rst languages (Farsi and Chinese) to make quick memorization easier. Five participants mentioned that they watched the readout eld in the PIN conditions, while others preferred to watch only the nger gesture as it was performed.
Participants mentioned several factors that could make PIN and grid passcodes challenging to accurately record. These included grid pattern shapes that crossed over themselves or contained knightmoves (n=11, e.g. 743521 and 4572, Figure 4 ), as well as both long physical jumps between sequential PIN digits (n=3) and sequential digits physically close together (n=7). Ten participants reported that viewing from the right was harder because their view of the phone screen was partially blocked by the victim-proctor's thumb in his right-handed grip, which is supported in the data, particularly for NPAT results. Six participants also felt that glare from overhead lighting was sometimes an issue.
Other passcode features and conditions were described as helpful by observers. Four participants mentioned that it was easier to memorize shapes that they could easily associate with a visual image, such as 136785 as a house, or 842157 as a picnic table (Figure 4 ).
Finally, multiple observations of the same passcode were commonly deemed helpful for conrming or piecing together sequences, although one participant stated that it was easier to do this if both observations were made from the same side. This is supported by the quantitative data.
IMPLICATIONS
Importance of evaluating in appropriate settings. Researchers often favor performing studies examining observational attacks with video-based stimuli presented to participants. While likely simpler to coordinate and easier to control compared to studies conducted in live settings, video studies can lack realism and are considered a methodological substitute only when necessary [27] . While ndings from video studies can be helpful to determine attack rate, our ndings suggest that researchers evaluating authentication interfaces should be aware that there is no substitute for testing in live settings, as the video baseline may greatly underestimate the threat of an attacker. The video baseline may serve as a method for a preliminary assessment.
Factors which should be taken into account when performing observational attack studies. While factors such as authentication type and repeated views can impact attack rate, as evidenced through our study, other factors are worthy of further investigation. Examples include examination of the impact of observational angle and spatial properties of passcodes and device screen sizes. While signicant dierences in some of these factors could not always be detected, subjective feedback gathered from participant observers suggested that these factors could make a dierence to attacker success. Examining these in more detail, alongside gathering subjective data for purposes of identifying reasoning, is suggested to researchers, as these may play a greater role than once thought.
Care in selection of passcode. Our results suggest that specic types and properties of passcode may be more susceptible to observational attack, as identied through the comparison with live settings. As a result, users should be aware that removing the feedback lines from pattern unlock interfaces may not provide the security benets that users expect. Secondly, PINs are more susceptible to attack than previously identied by researchers performing video-based studies. This is also supported in our qualitative feedback where participants noted that PINs with larger jumps were harder to attack, and for PAT/NPAT, those that are less "shape like" (e.g. resembling a house-like shape) are harder for participants.
Need for training. As our ndings have highlighted that observational attacks are more successful under specic conditions, security training for mobile device users can be developed to better understand the nature of observational threats, encouraging them to make better security choices. Some users may need to better understand what methods and parameters would provide resilience against high-probability multiple-view observation attacks mounted by "insider threats" [28] . Others might want those authentication factors tilted towards greater ease of use if they perceive less risk of observational attack. Better informing these choices could come in the form of interactive guidance/prompting when setting-up devices.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have described a study comparing video recreations of shoulder surng to live simulation. We recreated a subset of the factors explored in the video study and attempted to conrm prior ndings in this setting. We were able to conrm many of the prior claims regarding the video study, that authentication type, repeated viewings, observation angle, and passcode properties can aect attacker performance. We were also able to conrm that video study does form a baseline for the live simulation; however, this baseline may be much less than desired, as much as 1.9x dierence. From these ndings we suggest, for researchers conducting shoulder surng studies with video components, that data can form a baseline and be representative, in many situations, of what would occur in a live simulation. However, when possible, those results should be compared to a live simulation to get a fuller picture of the data and results.
A SURVEY MATERIAL A.1 Ante Hoc Demographic Questionnaire
(1) What is your age? (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, +65, NA)? (2) What is your identied gender? (3) Do you have any physical conditions that might prevent you from observing authentication gestures performed on a mobile phone? (4) Do you use a smartphone currently? If so, what is its operating system? (5) Why did you select that phone and OS? (6) If you currently use an authentication method to lock your phone, what is the method (i.e. PIN, TouchID, grid, etc.), and why did you select it? (7) What types of mobile phone authentication have you used? (i.e. PIN, grid pattern, password, ngerprint, face, voice, other) (8) Without telling me your current passcode, how do you select the passcodes you use? (9) How concerned are you with keeping your phone secure (1, not at all concerned, to 5, highly concerned)? (10) What experiences can you recall involving people either trying to steal or use your phone without permission? (11) What experiences can you recall involving people trying to observe your passcodes without permission? (12) How concerned are you with the threat of someone watching you authenticate and collecting your passcodes (1, not at all concerned, to 5, highly concerned)? (13) If you had any of these experiences, how did it aect your behavior? (14) Have any other experiences or concerns aected your authentication?
A.2 Post Hoc Participant Strategies Questionnaire Questions
(1) What strategies did you employ to collect the passcodes?
(2) Do you have any ideas for additional strategies?
(3) How challenging was it to collect PIN passcodes (1, not at all challenging, to 5, very challenging)? (4) How challenging was it to collect grid passcodes (1, not at all challenging, to 5, very challenging)? (5) What features of the passcodes made it easier or more dicult to collect the passcodes you saw? (6) How did the number of views you were given make a dierence? (7) How did which side you stood on make any dierence? 
A.3 Observation Forms
A.4 Guide/Script for Administering Study
(1) Verify current participant number, exp (1-4, order (a-c). Record this. (2) Introduction -"Welcome, thanks for participating. Our study deals with the security of dierent types of passcodes for mobile phones. Your help today will be pretty straightforward. We will record some basic demographic information about
